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INTRODUCTION
What would have happened if the Patient Protection and Afforda1
ble Care Act (PPACA) really had authorized government “death pa2
nels” that would decide whether or not an elderly patient could get
treatment? Leaving aside the Commerce Clause and other constraints
particular to Congress, would that kind of direct health care rationing
be a constitutional exercise of governmental power in the United
States? I think not. I argue here that an emergent substantive due
process constraint would invalidate such an exercise; the phantom
death panels would violate a constitutional “freedom of health” that is
nascent in Supreme Court precedent. Based on that logic, I argue
further that the substantive due process analysis of PPACA’s “individual mandate”—the requirement that all Americans carry health insurance—may be more complicated than most scholars have recognized.
The existence of a freedom of health implies that we cannot merely
dismiss substantive due process challenges to the mandate on the
3
ground that Lochner is dead.
Particularly since 2006, when a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit recognized a fundamental liberty interest in obtaining experi-

1

Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
2
See Jim Rutenberg & Jackie Calmes, Getting to the Source of the ‘Death Panel’ Rumor,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2009, at A1 (detailing the political creation of administrativeeuthanasia-panel rumors and their lack of basis in the reform bill itself); see also A Look
at Claims About Health-Care Overhaul—Close Up, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 11, 2009, at A3
(debunking Governor Palin’s and other health care bill critics’ view that the bill would
create “death panels”).
3
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (striking down a state regulation
of the hours of bakery employees as an unconstitutional infringement on the substantive due process right to freedom of contract), abrogated by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Mark A. Hall, The Constitutionality of Mandates to Purchase
Health Insurance, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS (SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT S2) 38, 45 (2009) (arguing that the mandate implicates only economic interests and therefore, given the
death of the Lochner era, implicates no modern substantive due process right).
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4

mental drugs (later overturned en banc), health law scholars have
debated the usefulness and propriety of protecting individuals’ liberty
5
in medical decisionmaking. Unlike the international “human right
to health,” this American “freedom of health” would operate primarily
as a restriction on—rather than as an obligation for—governmental
6
regulation of medical decisionmaking. That is, in the somewhat disputed parlance of constitutional law, the right would be a negative

4

See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach
(Abigail Alliance I ), 445 F.3d 470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that a terminally ill,
mentally competent patient has a protected liberty interest in accessing potentially lifesaving investigational new drugs deemed safe enough for expanded human trial), rev’d
en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
5
See B. Jessie Hill, Reproductive Rights as Health Care Rights, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 501, 537-39 (2009) [hereinafter Hill, Reproductive Rights] (urging reproductive rights
advocates to ground the abortion right in a constitutional freedom of health); B. Jessie
Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines,
86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 324-28 (2007) [hereinafter Hill, Tale of Two Doctrines] (outlining
the Supreme Court’s treatment of the individual freedom of health and the state interest in regulating health as separate doctrines and tracing them through Supreme
Court jurisprudence); Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, The Public’s Right to Health: When Patient Rights Threaten the Commons, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1335, 1386-88 (2009) (arguing
that there should not be an individual freedom of health on the ground that such a
freedom would endanger public health); John A. Robertson, Controversial Medical
Treatment and the Right to Health Care, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.–Dec. 2006, at 15, 16
[hereinafter Robertson, Controversial Medical Treatment] (providing legal and historical
foundations for a constitutional freedom of health that could be applied in Abigail Alliance); John A. Robertson, Embryo Culture and the “Culture of Life”: Constitutional Issues
in the Embryonic Stem Cell Debate, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 32-37 [hereinafter Robertson,
Embryo Culture] (arguing that the constitutional freedom of health should prohibit restrictions on embryonic stem cell research); Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1815-17
(2007) (basing the freedom of health in a right of self-defense). At least one scholar
considered and elaborated this possibility before Abigail Alliance was decided. See Elizabeth G. Patterson, Health Care Choice and the Constitution: Reconciling Privacy and Public
Health, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 22-28 (1989) (evaluating Supreme Court precedent on
the right to refuse proffered care).
6
See Hill, Reproductive Rights, supra note 5, at 503 (explaining the difference between positive and negative rights and arguing for a “negative right to health” that
would “be understood as a right against government interference in health care access
and medical decisionmaking, rather than a right to government-provided medical services”); Hill, Tale of Two Doctrines, supra note 5, at 330 n.277 (same); Robertson, Controversial Medical Treatment, supra note 5, at 15 (distinguishing “positive rights to statefunded resources” from the right asserted in Abigail Alliance and characterizing the Abigail Alliance right as a “negative right to health care” that would protect “the right of a
patient and doctor to pursue a course of treatment of their choosing without interference by the government”); Robertson, Embryo Culture, supra note 5, at 7-8 (arguing for
a “negative right against governmental interference with therapy . . . not a positive
right to state resources”).
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7

one rather than a positive one, protected alongside other negative
liberties under the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of substantive
8
due process.
As a handful of scholars have already pointed out, there is support
in Supreme Court precedent for this kind of constitutional freedom
9
of health. Particularly in its forced treatment, right to die, and reproductive rights cases, the Supreme Court has hinted that the constitutional right to bodily integrity includes both a freedom to reject un10
wanted medical intervention and a freedom to obtain certain health
11
care goods and services. In other words, the Supreme Court has
hinted that Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” includes individual autonomy in health care decisionmaking.
Both the existence and the strength of the Supreme Court’s freedom of health, however, are subject to ongoing debate. We know, at a
minimum, that the Supreme Court’s hints convinced two D.C. Circuit
judges to recognize the health care liberty interest, to treat it as “fundamental,” and to apply it to invalidate longstanding administrative
12
processes for drug approval. But we also know that litigants asserting
13
the freedom of health in American courts have not always succeeded.
7

See generally ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty (drawing out and discussing the
difference between positive and negative rights), in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 12234 (1969). For a succinct modern legal discussion of the distinction and its limitations,
see Richard A. Posner, The Cost of Rights: Implications for Central and Eastern Europe—and
for the United States, 32 TULSA L.J. 1, 2-3 (1996). For a longer critique of the distinction
as it applies to American constitutional doctrine, see David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986).
8
See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 755-73 (1997) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (discussing the general theory and practice of substantive due process
rights and providing examples of such rights).
9
See Hall, supra note 3, at 45 (noting that the Supreme Court has recognized a
liberty interest in rejecting care and that there might be a similar interest in obtaining
it); Hill, Reproductive Rights, supra note 5, at 531-37 (tracing the freedom of health
through Supreme Court and lower court cases); Hill, Tale of Two Doctrines, supra note 5,
at 329-32 (defending the conclusion that “the Supreme Court has already recognized a
substantive-due-process right to make medical treatment decisions without unwarranted government interference”); Patterson, supra note 5, at 22-33 (cataloging and
discussing Supreme Court precedents that support a freedom of health); Volokh, supra
note 5, at 1824-28 (deriving a right of medical self-defense from the Supreme Court’s
abortion jurisprudence).
10
See infra subsection I.A.1.
11
See infra subsection I.A.2.
12
Abigail Alliance I, 445 F.3d 470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
13
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165-68 (2007) (affirming a statute banning certain abortion procedures even though they may be safer in some circumstances); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705-06 (holding that statutes criminalizing assisting suicide do not violate the Fourteenth Amendement); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health,
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There are, in fact, more Supreme Court evasions of the freedom of
14
health than there are Supreme Court acknowledgements of it, and
the freedom of health has rarely been used at all—and never been
used alone—to invalidate state action.
Importantly, though, the rarity of judicial invalidation does not
prove that the freedom of health does not or cannot exist. First, like
all constitutional freedoms, the freedom of health may be implicitly
protected in congressional decisionmaking. Indeed, the difficulties in
passing health care reform suggest that political constraints of a constitutional dimension might be in play. Second, like all constitutional
freedoms, the freedom of health could not be absolute. Even if given
the highest level of constitutional protection—if designated a “fundamental liberty interest”—individuals’ freedom of health would be
subject to a state-interest override. In standard doctrinal terms, the
individual right could be infringed if the restrictive legislation were
15
“narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” If situated as
a typical Fourteenth Amendment liberty, therefore, the constitutional
freedom of health would prohibit the government from burdening
autonomous health care decisions without a compelling reason, but it
would not prohibit narrowly tailored public-health-justified or otherstate-interest-justified infringements. So framed, this constitutional
freedom seems already to exist, and the Supreme Court certainly
could formalize it without deviating from precedent.
This Article first draws out the freedom of health from Supreme
Court precedent and demonstrates that, like other substantive constitutional rights, the freedom of health is a negative liberty that must be
balanced against legitimate and compelling regulatory projects. The
Article then applies that understanding of the freedom to evaluate
some proposed and actual health care regulations that have made
headline news in the last decade. I consider the constitutionality of
the phantom death panels, the H1N1 vaccine distribution program,

497 U.S. 261, 286-87 (1990) (upholding a state’s ability to decline a parent’s request to
withhold nutrition and hydration absent clear and convincing evidence of the incompetent’s wishes); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1927) (upholding a state practice
of requiring sterilization of the mentally ill); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38
(1905) (upholding a mandatory smallpox vaccination policy).
14
See infra Part I (discussing numerous instances in which the Court found state
interests compelling enough to override the freedom of health).
15
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). But cf.
Patterson, supra note 5, at 48-49 (suggesting that courts should use intermediate scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny, to enforce the freedom of health and defining the relevant rubric).
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the FDA’s restrictions on access to experimental drugs, PPACA’s obesity and smoking regulations, and, of course, PPACA’s individual
mandate. Should those programs and regulations be constitutionally
permissible under a Fourteenth Amendment freedom of health?
My answer is that the freedom of health, if formalized in its current form, would invalidate some but not all of the proposed interventions. “Death panels” (in the form that Governor Palin understood
16
them to take ) would be prototypically unconstitutional under the
new rubric (though incentives for doctors to gather and enforce ad17
vanced directives —the would-have-been effect of the sinceabandoned provision that sparked the “death panels” debate—
certainly would not be). The vaccine distribution program during the
2009 H1N1 flu outbreak could have raised constitutional questions if
the states had included criminal or high civil penalties for misdistribution of the vaccine, but in the absence of such penalties, the distribution guidelines did not offend the freedom of health. Restrictions on
access to experimental drugs should be constitutionally permissible
because they promote a compelling state interest in gathering information about the safety and efficacy of new drugs, but the current
regulatory regime may not be sufficiently “narrowly tailored” to the
state interest it seeks to promote. Obesity regulations might be unconstitutional, depending on their form, while most anti-smoking
regulations should not be. PPACA’s wellness initiatives do not raise
serious constitutional problems.
Perhaps most interestingly (and certainly most relevantly given
18
present litigation ), the individual mandate would require a more
16

See Sarah Palin, Statement on the Current Health Care Debate, FACEBOOK (Aug. 7,
2009, 4:26 PM), http://www.facebook.com/note.php?not_id=113851103434 (claiming
that the health reform bill would require “my parents or my baby with Down Syndrome . . . to stand in front of [President] Obama’s ‘death panel’ so his bureaucrats
can decide, based on a subjective judgment of their ‘level of productivity in society,’
whether they are worthy of health care”).
17
See America’s Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, 111th Cong.
§ 1233 (authorizing Medicare coverage for “advance care planning consultation,” including explanation of advance directives, such as living wills, durable powers of attorney, and health care proxies); see also Toby Harnden, Obama Retreats on ‘End of Life’
Plans, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Aug. 15, 2009, at 5 (discussing the political demise
of § 1233); Charles Hurt, Granny Lives! ‘End of Life’ Out of Health Plan, N.Y. POST, Aug.
14, 2009, at 10 (same); Clarence Page, Editorial, ‘Death Panels’ Myth Just Won’t Die, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 1, 2009, at 31 (same).
18
Compare Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 100091, 2011 WL 285683, at *33 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (holding that PPACA exceeded
Congress’s authority under both the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper
Clause), and Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 788 (E.D. Va.
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careful analysis under a freedom of health than scholars and courts
have assumed. That said, the state interest in enforcing the mandate
seems sufficiently strong to support some infringement of individual
liberty, and the actual law supporting the individual mandate imposes
a negligible burden on the relevant liberty interest. The individual
mandate is a necessary element of health insurance regulation, assuming that universal coverage is a reasonable goal; without a mandate,
adverse selection will cause many individuals to be priced out of coverage. PPACA’s individual mandate seeks to correct adverse selection
through an almost entirely rhetorical set of laws, which impose almost
no actual burden on the constitutional liberty interest. As written, no
executive official has authority to enforce the mandate against noncompliant individuals. As such, the current “mandate” should pass
the strict scrutiny test on the ground that it poses an infinitesimal
burden to liberty. If, however, Congress were to bolster the mandate
with real enforcement power and heftier fines, the constitutional anal19
ysis under the freedom of health should, I think, become harder.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I fleshes out the freedom of
health, identifying its foundations in existing American precedent and
describing its differences from the “right to health” in international law.
Part II considers the controversial proposals and enactments that have
made news in recent health care reform debates, using analysis of those
issues to develop the framework for enforcing a freedom of health.
I. THE FREEDOM OF HEALTH
As a handful of scholars have pointed out, a constitutional free20
dom of health already exists at the margins of American law. In the
forced treatment, reproductive rights, and right-to-die cases, the Su-

2010) (holding that PPACA exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce
Clause and Congress’s independent taxation power), with Mead v. Holder, No. 100950, 2010 WL 611139, at *21 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011) (granting the government’s motion to dismiss a suit that argued against PPACA’s constitutionality and sought declaratory and injunctive relief), Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 10-0015, 2010 WL
4860299, at *16 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010) (same), and Thomas More Law Ctr. v.
Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 895 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (same).
19
This line of analysis does not, of course, speak to the mandate’s validity under
the Commerce Clause or under various taxing provisions of the Constitution, which
have been scholars’ and courts’ primary focus so far. See, e.g., Steven J. Willis & Nakku
Chung, Constitutional Decapitation and Healthcare, 128 TAX NOTES 169, 178-93 (2010)
(arguing that the penalty for failure to comply with the individual mandate is unconstitutional under taxing provisions of the Constitution).
20
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 9.
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preme Court has hinted that Americans hold an important—perhaps
fundamental—liberty interest in directing their own health care,
which at least includes a right to reject unwanted medical interventions and might include a right to obtain desired medical treatment.
Importantly, this constitutional right, like most American constitutional rights, is a so-called “negative” rather than “positive” right. That
is, the Supreme Court has never indicated that the national or state
governments are required to provide Americans with access to health
care—only that they may not encumber that access without justification. This Part will briefly trace the freedom of health through Supreme Court precedent and then draw a rough sketch of the doctrine
that emerges, distinguishing the “negative” American freedom of
health from the “positive” international human right to health and also offering a “participant-regulator” distinction to flesh out the “positive-negative” distinction between American and international rights.
A. The Freedom of Health in the Supreme Court
In 2006, a panel of the D.C. Circuit held that terminally ill patients have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in accessing ex21
perimental drugs that might extend their lives. Further, the court
held that the Food and Drug Administration’s prohibitions on the interstate marketing and sale of those experimental drugs impermissibly
burdened the patients’ liberty interest and were therefore unconstitu22
23
tional. Although later overturned en banc, the panel decision in
Abigail Alliance sparked a flurry of scholarship on the question of
24
whether there is or should be a constitutional right to health care.
Somewhat puzzlingly, much of this scholarship treats the public
interest in regulating health as anathema to the individual freedom of
health (and, vice versa, the individual freedom as anathema to the
public interest in health regulation)—as though the two cannot coex25
ist in constitutional doctrine. The purpose of this Section is to dem21

See Abigail Alliance I, 445 F.3d 470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc, 495 F.3d
695 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
22
Id.
23
See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach
(Abigail Alliance II), 495 F.3d 695, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (upholding the “FDA’s policy of
limiting access to investigational drugs [because it] is rationally related to the legitimate state interest of protecting patients, including the terminally ill, from potentially
unsafe drugs with unknown therapeutic effects”).
24
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 5.
25
See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 5, at 1344 (“Individual rights seem inherently at
odds with the collective, population-based perspective central to public health.”). But
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onstrate that these supposed strands of constitutional health law are
actually one coherent doctrine—albeit an underdeveloped, nascent
one in Supreme Court jurisprudence. The public interest in regula26
tion—or, as one scholar puts it, the “public’s right to health” —is
simply a “state interest” that sometimes (but not always) overrides the
individual liberty interest in health care autonomy, much as the state
interests in regulating obscenity, fighting words, and elections some27
times override the individual freedom of speech.
In this Section, I will trace that single coherent doctrine through
two strings of Supreme Court cases: those that imply a freedom to reject medical care and those that imply a freedom to obtain it.
1. Freedom to Reject Care
a. Origins
The American freedom of health, as developed by the Supreme
Court, got its somewhat inauspicious start in the 1905 case of Jacobson
28
v. Massachusetts. Challenging a Cambridge Board of Health directive
that all resident adults be vaccinated against smallpox, Henning Jacobson argued that the underlying statute and its execution against
him violated “the inherent right of every freeman to care for his own
29
body and health in such way as to him seems best.” Often cited for
the proposition that the individual freedom of health must not be a
30
fundamental liberty interest, the unanimous opinion upheld the statutory scheme in the face of Jacobson’s challenge.
But reading the Jacobson opinion as a whole and rehabilitating it to
modern substantive due process analysis, its logic is fully consistent
31
with a constitutional freedom of health. Writing for the Court, Jussee Patterson, supra note 5, at 47-49 (using intermediate scrutiny to balance individual
and collective interests within a single constitutional doctrine).
26
Leonard, supra note 5, at 1335.
27
See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (elections); Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)
(fighting words).
28
197 U.S. 11 (1905).
29
Id. at 26.
30
See Hill, A Tale of Two Doctrines, supra note 5, at 296-99 (discussing the Court’s
considerable deference to states’ “broad police power to act in the interest of public
health and safety” at the expense of individual liberty); Leonard, supra note 5, at 1347
(citing Jacobson for the proposition that “[t]here are . . . limits on liberty or bodily integrity rights”).
31
Elizabeth Patterson also reads Jacobson this way. See Patterson, supra note 5, at 47
(“The Jacobson Court gave substantial credence to the defendant’s claim that a manda-
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tice Harlan emphasized the “great dangers” of the smallpox epidem32
ic and found it important that the vaccine posed no unique health
33
risk for Jacobson. He then specifically reserved the possibility that an
individual with such unique risks could win an as-applied challenge if
34
ordered to take the vaccine. In other words, the Court found that
the state had a compelling interest in combating infectious disease
and that Massachusetts’s forced vaccination law was narrowly tailored
to serve that interest—particularly in its application to an individual
with no unique risks and because it gave an expert, local board of
health authority to determine when vaccination was necessary. Having so concluded, the Court did not need to decide whether Jacobson’s asserted liberty interest in health care autonomy was protectable,
35
much less whether it was fundamental. That is, even if the freedom
tory vaccination law effected a substantial invasion of his liberty; however, the Court
found that liberty interest outweighed by the public interest in preventing the spread
of contagious disease . . . .”).
32
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 29.
33
See id. at 30 (noting that Jacobson’s objections to the vaccination were based on
“the general theory of those of the medical profession who attach little or no value to
vaccination as a means of preventing the spread of smallpox or who think that vaccination causes other diseases of the body,” rather than on any unique threat to his own
life or health).
34
See id. at 38-39 (noting that the Court’s holding should not be understood to
apply in circumstances where vaccination would be “cruel or inhuman”). At least one
other scholar highlights this point in reading Jacobson as a freedom of health case. See
Hill, Reproductive Rights, supra note 5, at 535 (acknowledging the Jacobson Court’s suggestion “that individuals have a right to protect their health against state-imposed
harm from required vaccines”).
35
In its most direct considerations of the asserted liberty interest, the Court gave
conflicting signals as to the interest’s constitutional standing. Justice Harlan asserted
that “[e]ven liberty itself, the greatest of all rights,” needed to be balanced against the
“safety, health, peace, good order and morals of the community,” thereby providing an
analysis that resembles modern balancing of interests. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26-27
(quoting Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 89 (1890)). He also, however, concluded with the following analysis:
While this court should guard with firmness every right appertaining to life,
liberty or property as secured to the individual by the Supreme Law of the
Land, it is of the last importance that it should not invade the domain of local
authority except when it is plainly necessary to do so in order to enforce that
law. . . . [W]e do not perceive that this legislation has invaded any right secured by the Federal Constitution.
Id. at 38. That last paragraph may mean only that the law survived constitutional scrutiny (because it was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest) and therefore did not violate Jacobson’s constitutional rights, or it might mean that the legislation did not even implicate those constitutional rights. Given the rest of the opinion
and its careful balancing of state and individual interests, the former interpretation
seems more compelling. But the latter is certainly possible.
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of health existed and garnered the highest level of constitutional protection, the Court found that the Massachusetts law was constitutionally valid. The Jacobson opinion, thus, certainly does not preclude—and
its analytic mode of balancing individual and collective interests may
support—a constitutional freedom of health.
The next assertion of the freedom of health came twenty years lat36
er in the first of two forced-sterilization cases, Buck v. Bell. As it had
in the Jacobson opinion, the Court rejected the constitutional challenge but did so in a way that is consistent with a modern freedom of
health. Carrie Buck brought a somewhat vague, or at least unspeci37
fied in the opinion, substantive due process challenge to a Virginia
38
statute that authorized mental institutions to sterilize their patients.
Under the statute, an institution could require sterilization if there
was evidence, adduced at a hearing with the patient present, that the
underlying reason for the individual’s commitment was hereditary.
39
Such evidence existed in Buck’s case.
40
For an eight-Justice majority, Justice Holmes wrote a characteristically curt opinion that nevertheless balanced Ms. Buck’s individual
41
interests in health and safety against the state’s interest in avoiding
the social costs of institutionalizing persons with cognitive and mental
42
disabilities. Although unpersuasive through a modern lens of reproductive rights and mental health advocacy, the Court’s conclusion was

36

274 U.S. 200 (1927).
See id. at 205 (“The case comes here upon the contention that the statute authorizing the judgment is void under the Fourteenth Amendment as denying to the plaintiff in error due process of law and the equal protection of the laws.”); id. at 207 (“The
attack is not upon the procedure but upon the substantive law. It seems to be contended that in no circumstances could such an order be justified.”).
38
See id. (“An Act of Virginia . . . recites that the health of the patient and the welfare of society may be promoted in certain cases by the sterilization of mental defectives, under careful safeguard . . . .”).
39
See id. (“Carrie Buck is a feeble minded white woman who . . . is the daughter of
a feeble minded mother in the same institution, and the mother of an illegitimate
feeble minded child.”).
40
Justice Butler dissented without writing a separate opinion. See id. at 208.
41
See id. at 205 (“[T]he sterilization may be effected in males by vasectomy and in
females by salpingectomy, without serious pain or substantial danger to life . . . .”); id.
at 207 (“Buck . . . may be sexually sterilized without detriment to her general health
and that her welfare and that of society will be promoted by her sterilization.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
42
See id. at 207 (“We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call
upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those
who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be
such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence.”).
37
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that the state interest in avoiding public support costs for disabled individuals was sufficiently compelling and that the forced sterilization
program, with its limited application to institutionalized patients with
known hereditary conditions, was narrowly tailored enough to justify
43
the intrusion on liberty. As in Jacobson, then, the Buck Court did not
need to decide whether the asserted freedom of health deserved formal constitutional recognition because the majority concluded that the
sterilization regime would be constitutionally permissible in any event.
Admittedly, the Jacobson and Buck opinions do not follow modern
“strict scrutiny” or even “intermediate scrutiny” analysis, but neither
are they as casual as “rational basis” review would allow. Both cases
give credit to the asserted liberty interest and take seriously the plaintiffs’ specific interests in health and autonomy. That is, the opinions
do not conclude that any rational reason for forcing vaccination or
sterilization would suffice; rather, they conclude that the particular
state interests implicated are sufficiently compelling to override the
particular individual interests asserted. In their analytic modes, therefore, they support a constitutional freedom of health.
In the second of the two forced-sterilization cases, Skinner v. Okla44
homa, the Court invalidated a statute that permitted sexual steriliza45
tion of “habitual” criminals, but it did so on equal protection rather
than substantive due process grounds, thereby leaving Buck v. Bell in46
tact. Nevertheless, the Skinner majority held that the assertion of an
unequal classification—differential treatment of similar criminal categories—required “strict scrutiny” (the first use of that term in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence) because it implicated “one of the
47
basic civil rights of man,” namely “[m]arriage and procreation.” The
Court emphasized the irreparable and uncertain effects of sterilization, noting that state-sponsored sterilization “can cause races or types
48
which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear.”
This analysis is not a standard freedom-of-health analysis; the interest
that the Court emphasized is not an interest in avoiding surgical intervention or even in avoiding standard health consequences such as ill-

43

See id. (“In view of the general declarations of the legislature and the specific
findings of the Court, obviously we cannot say as matter of law that the grounds [for
sterilization] do not exist, and if they exist they justify the result.”).
44
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
45
See id. at 536.
46
See id. at 542 (distinguishing and thereby preserving Buck).
47
Id. at 541.
48
Id.
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ness, pain, disfigurement, or death. But Skinner’s acknowledgement
of a right to marriage and procreation ultimately forms the foundation for the constitutional freedom to obtain medical treatment,
which emerges from the reproductive rights cases. It is therefore important to note the case here, even though the opinion is not a strong
datum for the freedom to reject care.
b. Modern Cases
The strongest data for that freedom, in fact, came nearly half a
century after Skinner, in a pair of cases considering forced-treatment
49
regimes. In Washington v. Harper, the question before the Court was
whether prisoners may refuse administration of antipsychotic medica50
51
tion, and in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the
question was whether a woman in a persistent vegetative state may
demand withdrawal of her feeding tubes—and whether, given her incompetence to make such a demand, her parents could do so on her
52
53
behalf. The Court concluded in Harper and strongly implied in Cru54
zan that patients hold a constitutional liberty interest in rejecting the
particular medical interventions at issue, but in both cases, the Court
55
upheld the relevant regulatory regimes on state-interest grounds.

49

494 U.S. 210 (1990).
See id. at 213 (“The central question before us is whether a judicial hearing is
required before the State may treat a mentally ill prisoner with antipsychotic drugs
against his will.”).
51
497 U.S. 261 (1990).
52
See id. at 280 (noting that the relevant question was whether it was constitutional
for Missouri hospitals to have in place “a procedural safeguard to assure that the action
of the surrogate” in “electing to have hydration and nutrition withdrawn in such a way
as to cause death” represented “the wishes expressed by the patient while competent”).
53
See Harper, 494 U.S. at 221-22 (“We have no doubt that . . . respondent possesses
a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic
drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
54
In Cruzan, the Court acknowledged that “under the general holdings of [the
Court’s] cases, the forced administration of life-sustaining medical treatment . . . would
implicate a competent person’s liberty interest.” 497 U.S. at 279. Without holding
that such a liberty interest exists, however, the Court then decided, “for purposes of
th[e] case,” to “assume that the United States Constitution would grant a competent
person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.”
Id. (emphasis added).
55
See id. at 282 (“Missouri has permissibly sought to advance these [state] interests
[in protecting incompetent patients’ lives and choices] through the adoption of a
‘clear and convincing’ standard of proof.”); Harper, 494 U.S. at 227 (“[G]iven the requirements of the prison environment, the Due Process Clause permits the State to
treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against
50
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In Harper, the recognition of the constitutional liberty interest
56
seemed to be a slam dunk for all nine Justices. Although the majority and dissenting opinions disagreed as to the strength of that interest
relative to the state’s interest in prison management, both opinions
recognized Harper’s constitutional right to reject unwanted antipsy57
chotic medication. Cruzan then built on that explicit recognition to
hold broadly that “a competent person has a constitutionally pro58
tected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment.” The
Cruzan majority, however, was hesitant to extend the general right to
cover even a competent patient’s decision to reject lifesaving treat59
ments, such as nutrition and hydration, much less a family’s decision
60
to do so on behalf of an incompetent patient. In the end, the majority did not decide whether the general right to reject care would cover
61
such life-and-death decisions.
What emerges from Harper and Cruzan, then, is an explicit constitutional freedom to reject medical interventions, at least so long as
those interventions are not necessary to preserve life. Admittedly, the
Cruzan majority left open the possibility that the general liberty interest is weaker or even nonexistent in the case of lifesaving nutrition
and hydration, but the opinion nevertheless recognizes a general constitutional freedom to reject care.
his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.”).
56
See Cruzan, 494 U.S. at 221-22 (finding for the six-Justice majority that Harper
“possesse[d] a significant liberty interest”); id. at 237 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority opinion for “undervalu[ing] respondent’s
liberty interest”).
57
For the dissent, the particular effects of antipsychotic medication enhanced
Harper’s liberty interest in avoiding its administration. See id. at 239-41 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing the intended mind-altering effects of the medication, as well as its dangerous unintended side effects).
58
497 U.S. at 278 (citing Harper as support for the recognition of this broad right).
59
See id. at 279 (noting that “the dramatic consequences involved in refusal of
such [lifesaving] treatment would inform the inquiry as to whether the deprivation of
that interest is constitutionally permissible” and ending with a mere assumption, rather
than conclusion, “that the United States Constitution would grant a competent person
a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition”).
60
The Court noted,
The difficulty with petitioners’ claim is that in a sense it begs the question: An
incompetent person is not able to make an informed and voluntary choice to
exercise a hypothetical right to refuse treatment or any other right. Such a
“right” must be exercised for her, if at all, by some sort of surrogate.
Id. at 280.
61
See id. at 279 (evaluating and upholding the enforcement regime on an assumption, rather than a holding, that it implicated a constitutional right).
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Neither Harper nor Cruzan, however, clarifies the constitutional
stature of that freedom. Although the dissenting opinions in both
cases specify that the freedom ought to be a “fundamental” right that
62
triggers strict scrutiny, the majority opinions do not offer a predefined rubric—a precise level of scrutiny—for analyzing the governmental intrusions. Of course, the cases do make clear that the state
interests asserted were sufficient to justify the regulatory regimes at issue, but neither of the majority opinions explicitly labels those interests as “compelling” (for strict scrutiny), “important” (for intermediate scrutiny), or “rational” (for rational basis review). The Supreme
Court has thus certainly recognized that the constitutional freedom to
reject medical care exists, but the freedom’s precise function is yet to
be determined.
2. Freedom to Obtain Care
Unlike the freedom to reject care, the freedom to obtain care
does not yet have a life of its own in Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Instead, its existence is implicit in and therefore tethered to the
63
Court’s reproductive rights jurisprudence —although, as I will discuss
shortly, it also gained five nonprecedential votes in the assisted-suicide
64
case. Despite its lack of formal recognition, the right to obtain care
has a solid foundation in existing constitutional law, particularly given
the difficulty of justifying some reproductive rights holdings without
reference to the freedom of health.
Specifically, the rights to contraception and abortion necessarily
create a freedom to obtain at least certain kinds of medical care. As
the Court has recognized, these reproductive rights would be meaningless without concomitant rights to access birth control mechanisms
65
and abortion surgeries, both of which require physician intervention.
62

See id. at 304 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[I]f a competent person has a liberty
interest to be free of unwanted medical treatment, . . . it must be fundamental.”);
Harper, 494 U.S. at 241 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“There
is no doubt . . . that a competent individual’s right to refuse [antipsychotic] medication is a fundamental liberty interest deserving the highest order of protection.”).
63
See generally Hill, Reproductive Rights, supra note 5, at 530-49 (identifying the
freedom-of-health components of abortion jurisprudence and urging reproductive
rights advocates to emphasize that basis for preservation of the abortion right).
64
See infra note 74 (discussing the concurring opinions in Washington v. Glucksberg,
502 U.S. 702 (1997)).
65
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 156-58 (2007) (recognizing that regulation of abortion “would be unconstitutional ‘if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains
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Furthermore, the abortion right has a health care dimension insofar
as a woman’s health or life might hang in the balance as she decides
66
whether to terminate a pregnancy. Professor Jessie Hill has already
traced both of these themes through the Supreme Court’s reproduc67
tive rights cases; she has demonstrated that Roe v. Wade and its prog68
eny rest at least in part on a constitutional right to obtain medical
care and has highlighted the Supreme Court’s insistence—albeit
somewhat less pronounced in the most recent partial birth abortion
69
70
case —that abortion restrictions not endanger maternal health. I
will not reinvent that wheel here.
71
But the right-to-die case, Washington v. Glucksberg, provides
72
another important—and occasionally misunderstood —datum for the
existence of a constitutional freedom to obtain treatment. In Glucksberg, three terminally ill patients and their physicians challenged criminal prohibitions on assisted suicide, asserting that competent terminally ill patients should be free to obtain a physician’s help in

viability’” (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878-89
(1992))); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 687-89 (1977) (“Limiting the
distribution of nonprescription contraceptives to licensed pharmacists clearly imposes
a significant burden on the right of individuals to use contraceptives if they choose to
do so.” (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 461-64 (1972))).
66
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (observing that “[s]pecific and direct
harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy” may result from denying access
to abortions altogether); Hill, Reproductive Rights, supra note 5, at 531-32 (citing “the
requirement that abortion regulations must contain an exception to protect against
harm to a woman’s health” as an example of a “negative right to health”).
67
410 U.S. 113.
68
See, e.g., Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124; Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng.,
546 U.S. 320 (2006); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Casey, 502 U.S. 833;
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. 833; Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kan. City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S.
416 (1983), overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
69
See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 155-56 (upholding a partial birth abortion regulation
that lacked a health exception); Hill, Reproductive Rights, supra note 5, at 534 (noting
the shift in the Supreme Court’s tone regarding the health exception in Gonzales).
70
See Hill, Reproductive Rights, supra note 5, at 506-17 (describing the “medical
model of abortion” that the Supreme Court seemed to follow in early abortion decisions); id. at 534-37 (deriving a more general “negative right to health” from reproductive rights and other decisions).
71
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
72
See, e.g., Hill, Reproductive Rights, supra note 5, at 536-37 (failing to note Glucksberg’s odd procedural posture and therefore casting the majority opinion as less supportive of the freedom of health than is actually the case). But see Robertson, Embryo
Culture, supra note 5, at 10 (noting that five Justices in Glucksberg expressed support for a
constitutional right to access palliative care, including death-hastening medical care).
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73

hastening death. Because the three patients died before the case
reached the Supreme Court, however, the Court treated the challenge
as a facial assault on suicide bans—an assertion of a broad right to die
for all humans, terminally ill or not. So framed, the challenge did not
get a single vote; the Court unanimously rejected the freedom to
commit suicide.
Five Justices, however, authored concurring opinions that indicated their support for a narrower constitutional liberty interest in obtaining palliative care from a physician, even when that care might
hasten death. Justices O’Connor, Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer all wrote separately to indicate their support for—or at least
their interest in preserving the possibility of—a constitutional liberty
interest in access to pain management at the end of life and particularly an interest in access to physician care in managing pain. Indeed,
for at least four of those Justices, that narrower freedom to obtain palliative care seemed to trump the state’s interests in preserving life and
avoiding euthanasia; for them it appears that the provision of even
74
death-hastening palliation ought not to be criminalized. Because the
challenged statutes did not in fact criminalize death-hastening palliation, all five concurring Justices supported the judgments of the

73

See 521 U.S. at 707-08.
Only Justice Souter wrote that the state’s interests should trump the asserted
right to medical assistance. However, he was considering a right to physician-assisted
suicide, rather than a right to palliative care. And, even considering the more controversial suicide right, Justice Souter reserved the question of whether that right, if asserted as such (which it apparently was not), could “at some time[] be seen as ‘fundamental’ to the degree entitled to prevail.” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 781-82 (Souter, J.,
concurring). He wrote simply that a liberty interest in physician-assisted suicide was
not sufficient to trump the state’s compelling interest in avoiding a slippery slope to
euthanasia. See id. (noting that the state’s interest in “protecting terminally ill patients
from involuntary suicide and euthanasia, both voluntary and nonvoluntary,” was “dispositive for [him]” in addressing “the present claim that [Washington’s] law is arbitrary or purposeless”). The other four Justices strongly implied that they would have
voted differently if the state statutes had criminalized provision of death-hastening palliative care. See id. at 737-38 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that although patients
may have a “constitutionally cognizable interest in obtaining relief from . . . suffering,”
the Court did not need to address that possibility in the context of the Glucksberg challenge); id. at 748-50 (Stevens, J., concurring) (writing separately to note that a ripe asapplied challenge brought by still-living terminally ill patients might succeed); id. at
789 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (joining the logic of Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion); id. at 791 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that patients might have a fundamental
right to avoid pain but that the statutes at issue in Glucksberg did not implicate that right).
74
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Court, but they wrote separately to emphasize the importance of the
75
asserted constitutional freedom to obtain health care at the end of life.
Of course, as with the freedom-to-reject-care cases, neither the reproductive rights nor Glucksberg opinions—to the extent that they rest
on or recognize a freedom to obtain care—could be read to support an
absolute freedom. The state interest in protecting fetal life has been an
important constraint on women’s abortion rights throughout the Roe
76
line of cases —so strong, in fact, that it makes the Court’s scrutiny of
abortion restrictions look more like intermediate than strict scrutiny.
And the Glucksberg concurrences all recognize compelling state interests
77
in preserving life and avoiding euthanasia. As with the freedom to reject care, then, the freedom to obtain it must be balanced against regulatory interests, and that freedom (if it exists) certainly could be infringed if the restriction were sufficiently justified and tailored.
3. Conclusion
Throughout the Supreme Court’s constitutional health care jurisprudence, the Court has recognized the importance of asserted liberty interests in health care autonomy. As an aspect of general bodily
autonomy, the freedom to reject care has gained formal recognition
in a handful of cases, and as a necessary element of reproductive
rights, the freedom to obtain treatment has been an important,
though informal, player in several cases.
Of course, like all American constitutional rights, the freedom of
health is subject to limitation when it runs up against legitimate regulatory interests. And, in contrast to core American freedoms like speech
and religion, the Supreme Court has been quite willing to recognize
state interests in health care regulation, often referring to preservation

75

Id. at 777-82 (Souter, J., concurring) (grounding the right to physician assistance at the end of life in the general right to bodily autonomy and concluding that
“the importance of the individual interest here . . . cannot be gainsaid”).
76
See e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (“The
very notion that the State has a substantial interest in potential life leads to the conclusion that not all regulations must be deemed unwarranted. . . . In our view, the undue
burden standard is the appropriate means of reconciling the State’s interest with the
woman’s constitutionally protected liberty.”).
77
See generally Martha Minow, Which Question? Which Lie? Reflections on the Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (discussing the risk of abuse and coercion that might arise if assisted suicide were permitted and concluding that the Supreme Court was right to focus on that risk even though the restrictive regime does not
eliminate the practice of assisted suicide).
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of health and life as core “police powers” of the states. In the end,
then, the freedom of health seems to be an important constitutional
freedom, but it is also one that requires balancing against many legitimate—even compelling—regulatory projects.
B. The Freedom of Health Versus the Right to Health
Before applying this freedom of health to current regulatory debates, it is important to flesh out the distinction between the American freedom of health and the international human right to health.
The primary difference between the two is that the American freedom
restricts regulation while the international right requires participa79
tion. This difference entails two characteristics of substantive freedoms in American law: they are primarily negative rather than positive, and they focus primarily on regulation rather than participation.
Much work has already been done on the positive-negative distinction, both in the health law literature and in the broader constitution80
al law literature, so I will summarize those arguments briefly. I will
then spend more time identifying and exploring the second (participant-regulator) distinction, which is important to individual substantive rights generally and to the freedom of health particularly.
I will first discuss the positive-negative and participant-regulator
distinctions as they apply generally to the Constitution’s individual
substantive rights, and I will then use those two distinctions to flesh
out the difference between the American freedom of health and the
international right to health.

78

See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905) (“The good and welfare of
the [state], of which the legislature is primarily the judge, is the basis on which the police power rests . . . .”); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 62 (1873) (discussing
the significance of broad police powers to “the life and health of the citizen”).
79
International human rights are difficult to enforce, so I hesitate to embrace
them as obligations. See generally JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
80
See, e.g., Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the Right to Health
Care, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1325, 1331-37 (2010) (reviewing the arguments and literature
on both sides of the assertion that the Constitution is a “charter of negative rights”).
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1. The Positive-Negative and Participant-Regulator Distinctions
a. Positive-Negative
In asserting that the U.S. Constitution is a “charter of negative ra81
ther than positive liberties,” we typically mean that individual substantive rights limit governmental action rather than requiring it. As
Judge Richard Posner famously explained, “The men who wrote the
Bill of Rights were not concerned that government might do too little
82
for the people but that it might do too much to them.” On this understanding, then, the difference between negative and positive rights
is simply that negative rights are restrictions while positive rights are
obligations. A second, slightly more nuanced aspect of the positivenegative distinction, occasionally identified in the literature, is that
negative rights protect individuals against the government itself while
positive rights oblige the government to protect individuals against
outside influences, such as third-party aggression or natural or eco83
nomic conditions.
As many scholars have recognized, this distinction’s explanatory
power for American constitutional rights is real but limited. In at least
three interrelated respects, constitutional rights create obligations for
government action, and some of those are obligations to protect
against outside influences. First, many of the Constitution’s procedural rights are positive under this framework, requiring the govern84
85
ment to provide (at taxpayer expense) grand juries, petit juries, tri86
87
88
als, information to arrestees, and assistance of counsel; requiring
89
the government to obtain warrants before seizing property; and requiring the government to compensate property owners when effect90
ing a taking. Although many of these rights protect individuals only
against governmental attempts to deprive them of liberty or property
81

Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983).
Id.
83
See Currie, supra note 7, at 864 (noting that positive rights might obligate government “to protect people against hostile acts of third parties,” or even “to protect
them from hunger and disease”).
84
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
85
See id. amend. VI (protecting the right to a jury in criminal trials); id. amend.
VII (protecting the right to a jury in civil trials at common law).
86
Id. amend. VI.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. amend. IV.
90
Id. amend. V.
82
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and might therefore be enforcement elements of standard negative
91
rights, some also protect against private third parties who are, for ex92
ample, pressing criminal charges or suing at common law. Furthermore, the requirement that the government provide these services at
taxpayer expense rather than on a fee-for-service basis arguably protects the indigent against outside economic conditions, whether or
not they are of the government’s making. At least insofar as these
procedural rights oblige governmental protection against outside influence, they seem to be purely positive under the standard positivenegative rubric, and even those that are merely enforcement elements
of negative rights constitute clear obligations for government action
and are therefore positive in the broad sense.
Second, the Constitution seems to require the government to en93
force negative rights in property, tort, and contract, thereby placing
an affirmative obligation on the government to act as a creator and
enforcer of the common law. This constitutional requirement, if it is
indeed a constitutional right, fails both tests for negative rights; it is an
affirmative obligation for the government, and it is an obligation to
protect against third-party deprivations rather than governmental
94
ones.
Third and finally, as Judge Posner has recognized in his scholarly
95
work, even the substantive rights that most clearly take a negative91

See Currie, supra note 7, at 886-87 (describing the governmental obligations that
can arise from enforcement of negative rights).
92
In the criminal context, the rights primarily protect individuals against governmental deprivations of a negative right—either liberty itself in cases where conviction
results in imprisonment or property in cases where conviction results in a fine. As
such, they may be viewed as corollaries to negative rights and also as consistent with
the second aspect of the positive-negative distinction, the difference between protection from government and protection from outside influences. But the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury in civil suits obligates the government to protect individuals
from private third parties. The Seventh Amendment, thus, seems to be a pure positive
right according to the standard distinction.
93
See, e.g., Bronzon v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311, 320 (1843) (“Any such modification of a contract by subsequent legislation, against the consent of one of the parties, unquestionably impairs its obligations, and is prohibited by the Constitution.”); cf. Ogden v.
Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 255 (1827) (“[A] State bankrupt law, which impairs
the obligation of a contract, is unconstitutional in its application to such contract.”).
94
See Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic
Guarantees?, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2005) (arguing that the creation and protection
of private property and the market economy require active government assistance).
95
See Posner, supra note 7, at 3 (noting that every negative liberty entails “a corresponding positive liberty” by requiring “a public machinery of rights protection and
enforcement, a machinery that includes police, prosecutors, judges, and even publicly
employed or subsidized lawyers”).
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rights form—the freedoms of speech, religion, press, and assembly;
97
the rights to life, liberty, and property; and the protection of priva98
cy —are all meaningless without a concomitant obligation for the
government to enforce them. Even the central “negative rights,” thus,
give rise to affirmative obligations for governmental intervention,
usually in the form of judicial invalidation of infringing legislative or
99
executive action.
Nevertheless, there is something intuitively appealing and therefore persistently useful about the positive-negative distinction in
100
American constitutional law.
Certainly, the U.S. Constitution lacks
the broad social and economic guarantees—quintessential “positive
rights”—that appear in many other countries’ constitutions and in in101
Unlike many international human
ternational charters of rights.
rights, our substantive constitutional rights do not require the government to enable individuals to engage in constitutionally protected
activities (speech, religion, etc.); they require only that the government leave individuals free to engage in those activities. The U.S.
Constitution is therefore a “charter of negative rights” at least in relative terms, compared to international and foreign documents.
b. Participant-Regulator
There is a second distinction, though, that seems to have greater—or at least additional—explanatory power for the set of rights that
we choose to recognize and for the rights-enforcement scheme that
we choose to apply in American constitutional law: the participantregulator distinction. This distinction arose in Dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, with the Supreme Court holding that American

96

See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See id. amend. V (forbidding the national government from depriving individuals of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”); id. amend. XIV (forbidding state governments from doing the same).
98
See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“Various guarantees [in the Bill of Rights] create zones of privacy.”).
99
Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein have also discussed this point at length. See
generally STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY
DEPENDS ON TAXES (1999).
100
See, e.g., supra note 6 (citing sources that discuss the positive-negative distinction in the context of medical decisionmaking).
101
See generally Sunstein, supra note 94 (noting and attempting to explain the absence of social and economic guarantees in the Constitution).
97
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states may discriminate against out-of-state citizens if they are acting as
102
market participants but not if they are acting as market regulators.
103
The line between proprietary and regulatory action is thin, but
the conceptual difference is relatively clear and descriptively useful:
governmental provision or consumption of a good or service at public
expense is a participatory action; creation of incentives for private
provision of goods or services or for private consumption of goods or
104
Medicare and Medicaid, thus, are
services is a regulatory action.
participatory actions (public provision of health insurance), while
105
106
both the individual mandate and the health insurance subsidies
are regulatory actions (incentives for individuals to consume private

102

See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1980) (“The basic distinction . . . between States as market participants and States as market regulators makes
good sense and sound law . . . [because] the Commerce Clause responds principally to
state taxes and regulatory measures impeding free private trade in the national marketplace.”); see also Norman R. Williams & Brannon P. Denning, The “New Protectionism”
and the American Common Market, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 247, 294-304 (2009) (discussing the role of the market-participant doctrine in Supreme Court jurisprudence with
particular focus on a recent case, Department of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (2008)).
103
See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 541-42
(1985) (“To say that the distinction between ‘governmental’ and ‘proprietary’ proved
to be stable, however, would be something of an overstatement.”); Dan T. Coenen, The
Impact of the Garcia Decision on the Market-Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 727, 733-34 (discussing arguments that the ruling in Garcia
undermines the vitality of the Dormant Commerce Clause exception for state proprietary functions); Treg A. Julander, State Resident Preference Statutes and the Market Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 541, 573 (2002) (acknowledging that “as more levels of governmental action are added, and regulatory
and proprietary powers are mixed,” courts could very well arrive at different conclusions with respect to the same conduct (footnote omitted)).
104
There is some debate as to where exactly tax exemption falls within this framework. In Department of Revenue v. Davis, for example, there was disagreement as to
whether tax-exempt status for state municipal bonds (and not for similar out-of-state
bonds) should be seen as solely participatory or as part regulatory, part participatory.
See 553 U.S. at 345 (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing that market regulation is acceptable when it goes “hand in hand” with participation); cf. Dan T. Coenen, The Supreme
Court’s Municipal Bond Decision and the Market-Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1179, 1184-93 (2009) (arguing that Justice Souter mistakes this dual approach for an either/or designation).
105
See PPACA § 1501(b), 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(a) (West Supp. 1A 2010) (mandating minimum essential coverage).
106
See generally PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1401–1421, 124 Stat. 119, 213-38
(to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.) (providing tax
credits for qualified health plans); see also THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PUB.
NO. 7962-02, EXPLAINING HEALTH CARE REFORM: QUESTIONS ABOUT HEALTH INSURANCE SUBSIDIES (2010), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/796202.pdf (explaining the details and eligibility criteria for the PPACA tax credits).

MONCRIEFF_PRINT.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2232

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

6/4/2011 4:27 PM

[Vol. 159: 2209

107

insurance). In general, regulatory actions use the government’s po108
lice power, while participatory ones use the power of the purse.
Of course, governmental participation in a market skews private
activity within that market and therefore has incentive and regulatory
effects. The power of the purse cannot be wielded effectively without
taxation, which is generally considered a regulatory action, and rules
for distribution of and eligibility for publicly provided goods and services are regulatory decisions that, if externally dictated, would influence the government’s willingness and ability to participate. Furthermore, the two actions might regularly be substitutes; many governmental goals can be achieved through either participation or
regulation. But the point remains that participatory and regulatory
actions are conceptually (if not always practically) different.
Furthermore, the distinction seems relevant to theories of constitutional rights, and it helps to clarify the difference between the freedom of health and the right to health. In general, our individual
substantive rights focus on the government’s regulatory decisions, not
its participatory decisions. More specifically, American substantive
rights tend to restrict regulation or, occasionally, require regulation;
they almost never restrict or require participation. Some examples
follow, but bear in mind throughout that no American constitutional
right is absolute and that “restrictions” or “constraints” on regulation
are therefore different from “bars” or “prohibitions” on regulation:


107

The freedom of speech (broadly speaking and eschewing nuance)
constrains the government’s ability to regulate what we say or how
109
we say it, but it neither obligates the government to provide us
with public forums nor constrains the government’s ability to pro-

This distinction provides a good example of where the distinction between
proprietary and regulatory action becomes more formal than functional: subsidies for
private purchase of insurance are regulatory since they are incentives for private action, but the line between subsidizing private insurance and providing Medicare benefits is infinitesimally thin—particularly given that Medicare is largely administered by
private contractors.
108
Other examples include payment of unemployment benefits, which is a participatory action (public provision of wages), compared to the minimum wage law,
which is a regulatory action (incentives for private employers to use particular wage
rates); and road construction and maintenance (public consumption of construction
services), compared to speed limit laws (incentives for private behavior).
109
See generally C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25
UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978) (developing and evaluating three theories of the scope of
speech protection under the First Amendment); Harry H. Wellington, On Freedom of
Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105 (1979) (analyzing why and to what extent free expression
deserves governmental immunity).
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vide such forums, nor does it obligate nor forbid the government
110
from funding speech directly.


The freedom of press (again broadly speaking) constrains the gov111
ernment’s ability to regulate media organizations, but it neither
obligates the government to provide us with news nor constrains
112
government’s ability to run public news broadcasts.



The right to privacy restricts the government’s ability to regulate
113
abortion procedures, but it neither requires the government to
include abortion coverage in public health insurance nor prohibits
114
Similarly, government is limited in regulating
it from doing so.
access to contraceptive devices115 but may choose whether to provide public insurance coverage for them; and government is limited

110

See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 669 (1998) (rejecting a free speech challenge to the exclusion of a candidate from a debate on a public broadcasting station). See generally Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum:
Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 25-27 (discussing time, place, and manner restrictions on the freedom of speech); Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 236-56 (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the government’s ability to regulate public forums while still respecting the
First Amendment).
111
See Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975) (“The publishing business is, in short, the only organized private business that is given explicit
constitutional protection.”). Of course, regulations of broadcast media have been
more tolerable. See Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 990, 990 (1989) (noting that, while licensing of newspapers is unconstitutional, licensing of broadcasters is acceptable due to spectrum scarcity); Jonathan
Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1101, 1106 (1993) (“Ordinary First
Amendment philosophy strongly disfavors government licensing of speakers; the broadcast regulatory system, by contrast, embraces such licensing.” (footnote omitted)).
112
See, e.g., Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, 47 U.S.C. § 396 (2006) (establishing
the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and through it, the Public Broadcasting Service and National Public Radio). But see Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
369, 400-01 (1969) (upholding the FCC “fairness doctrine” requiring that both sides of
a controversy receive equal time on broadcast news).
113
See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text (discussing limitations upon abortion restrictions when a mother’s life is at risk).
114
In Maher v. Roe, the Court stated that
[t]here is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected
activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy. Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempts to
impose its will by force of law; the State’s power to encourage actions deemed
to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader.
432 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1977) (footnote omitted); see also PPACA § 1303(1), 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 18023 (West Supp. 1B 2010) (detailing abortion-funding rules).
115
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (declaring a law that forbade use of contraceptives unconstitutional).
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116

in regulating parental decisions but may choose whether or not to
provide public goods or services to parents, such as public educa117
tion, child care, or even child protection.

For the most part, then, constitutional rights restrict regulation rather
118
than participation.
There is an important caveat to the participant-regulator distinction, though. Substantive constitutional limits apply even when the
government is regulating only itself as a market participant—in other
words, even when the government is merely setting rules for its own
participatory programs. This point is easiest to see in the context of
the Equal Protection Clause, which prohibits discriminatory regulations (such as discriminatory distribution and eligibility decisions)
119
with respect to publicly provided goods and services.
But the point seems to apply broadly, beyond the textually specified equality requirement, to all constitutional constraints on regulation. For example, the Supreme Court invalidated, on free speech
116

See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (asserting that the
government cannot “unreasonably interfere[] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (striking down as unconstitutional a state prohibition on teaching children a foreign language).
117
See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196-97
(1989) (holding that the state’s failure to remove a child from an abusive father’s
home did not violate the Due Process Clause because the Clause did not impose upon
the state an affirmative duty to provide the child with adequate protection).
118
Religious freedom, of course, is an exception to this rule. The Establishment
Clause restricts governmental participation in religious markets. See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 117 (1992) (“The Establishment Clause . . . has been interpreted to forbid the government to aid or advance
religion.”); see also Jesse H. Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Standard, 47 MINN. L. REV. 329, 330 (1963) (arguing that public schools violate the
Establishment Clause through “solely religious activity” that is likely to compromise or
influence a student’s freedom of religious choice or belief). But cf. Michael W.
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1409, 1414-16 (1990) (arguing that the Establishment Clause was meant to
prevent Congress from interfering with state establishments of religion that existed at
the time of the founding). See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195 (1992) (rebutting Michael McConnell’s interpretation of
the Establishment Clause); Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV.
701 (1986) (examining the seemingly inconsistent outcomes in Establishment Clause
cases through the lens of the faded republican tradition).
119
The most famous examples are restrictions on discriminatory admissions policies in publicly funded schools, including both segregation and affirmative action. See,
e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007);
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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grounds, a ban on leafleting on public park grounds, roadways, and
120
sidewalks—a regulatory action that applied only to public property.
Importantly, the Court did not hold that the First Amendment obligated public provision of parks, roadways, and sidewalks for speech
purposes but rather that the government could not prohibit speech
on the public property that it already provided. Similarly, it seems
likely that the abortion right would come into play if the government
stripped Medicaid eligibility from otherwise-eligible women on the
121
The
ground that they had obtained privately funded abortions.
Constitution, thus, is not entirely hands-off with respect to government
participation in markets. Even when the government participates rather than regulates, its management decisions (unlike those of private
participants) must abide by some substantive constitutional limits.
Constitutional rights thus center on regulation rather than participation, but they restrict regulatory actions even within participatory
ones. The relevance of the participant-regulator distinction, then, is
that American individual rights neither require nor forbid participation itself, but they constrain regulation both within and beyond participatory programs.
2. The Freedom of Health as a Restriction on Regulation and the
Right to Health as a Requirement for Participation
The “right to health” in international human rights law purports to
require not just regulation but also participation. According to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the international human right to health guarantees all individuals “the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
122
health.” That right includes not only the freedom to reject or obtain
medical treatment but also an entitlement to a healthy environment
123
and to accessible treatment facilities. The right to health, thus, does
120

See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 169-74 (1939) (noting that the ban gave
police authorities too much power to decide which citizens were allowed to disseminate information).
121
See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1598-609 (6th ed.
2009) (discussing the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions).
122
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; see also OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS & WORLD HEALTH ORG., FACT SHEET NO. 31, THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 1
(2008) [hereinafter OHCHR FACT SHEET], available at http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Publications/Factsheet31.pdf (highlighting the “right to health” as a
“fundamental part of our human rights”).
123
See OHCHR FACT SHEET, supra note 122, at 3-4.
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not forbid excessive governmental involvement in private health care
decisionmaking; it obligates the government to provide citizens with
124
clean water, air, and streets and with hospitals, drugs, and doctors.
Admittedly, it is possible that a government could fulfill these obligations through mere regulation, offering incentives to expand private markets in environmental quality and health care service. But
most advocates of the right to health seem to believe—and it is hard
to imagine otherwise—that these obligations would require govern125
mental participation in the relevant markets.
In particular, advocates invoke the right to health when arguing for public health insurance, public provision of hospitals and clinics, publicly funded
treatment, public pharmaceutical research and development, public
126
water and sewage system improvements, and so on.
The right to health, thus, is undoubtedly a positive right in its formulation, requiring participation rather than just regulation at least in
its invocation and also occasionally in its enforcement in foreign
127
courts.
124

See id. at 22-28.
See, e.g., Eleanor D. Kinney, The International Human Right to Health: What Does
This Mean for Our Nation and World?, 34 IND. L. REV. 1457, 1471 (2001) (“[I]f the international right to health is to mean anything at all, it does seem appropriate to impose
some implementation obligations on states and also require affirmative action on the
part of government . . . .”); Wendy K. Mariner, Law and Public Health: Beyond Emergency
Preparedness, 38 J. HEALTH L. 247, 272-75 (2005) (recognizing that the obligations to
protect people from harm and to fulfill their health needs require affirmative government action).
126
See, e.g., Erik B. Bluemel, The Implications of Formulating a Human Right to Water,
31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 957, 969 (2004) (“The right to water might also be placed as a subordinate right to that of the right to health . . . .”); Gary E. Jones, Regulatory Takings and
Emergency Medical Treatment, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 145, 146 (2010) (analyzing the conflict between the right to health and our country’s fee-for-service health care system);
Patti E. Phillips, Adding Insult to Injury: The Lack of Medically-Appropriate Housing for the
Homeless HIV-Ill, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 567, 597-611 (1990–91) (extending the right to
health to argue for the provision of housing for indigent people with HIV).
127
See, e.g., Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721
(CC) at 728-29 (S. Afr.) (outlining the right to health in a case involving the antiviral
drug Nevirapine); see also George J. Annas, The Right to Health and the Nevirapine Case in
South Africa, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 750, 750-51 (2003) (using the Nevirapine case to
explore the power of the right to health to obligate government provision of care);
Mary Ann Torres, The Human Right to Health, National Courts, and Access to HIV/AIDS
Treatment: A Case Study from Venezuela, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 105, 111-14 (2002) (highlighting the implications of a prominent Venezuela Supreme Court case on the government’s
failure to provide antiviral therapies to treat HIV/AIDS); Alicia Ely Yamin, Not Just a Tragedy: Access to Medications as a Right Under International Law, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 325, 339-41
(2003) (“Costa Rica, India, Venezuela, Columbia, Argentina, and South Africa are
among the many countries in which national courts have determined that the state has
obligations to provide medications in HIV/AIDS cases and for other diseases.”).
125
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The freedom of health, by contrast, is a mostly negative right that only restricts regulation—and, of course, creates a concomitant obligation
for enforcement. Jacobson limits the government’s ability to regulate
vaccine consumption but does not oblige the government to provide
vaccinations—either through direct provision (i.e., participation) or
through subsidization (i.e., regulation). Buck and Skinner arguably limit
the government’s ability to regulate fertility but do not oblige the government to provide sterilization or fertility treatment. Harper and Cruzan limit the government’s ability to regulate consumption of medication and medical treatment but do not oblige the government to
provide pharmaceuticals or health care. The abortion cases limit the
government’s ability to regulate the procedure but do not oblige it to
include abortion coverage in public insurance or otherwise to provide
publicly financed abortions. And Glucksberg might limit the government’s ability to regulate consumption of palliative care at the end of
life but certainly does not oblige the government to provide that care.
The freedom of health, thus, does not oblige governmental participation in health care markets.
Of course, it does not forbid that participation either. Several
American governments (state and federal) do indeed provide publicly
financed vaccines, reproductive technologies, pharmaceuticals, abortion insurance, and hospice care. And, of course, we provide many of
our citizens with comprehensive public health insurance through
Medicare, Medicaid, the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program,
and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program, or even with
comprehensive public health care through the Military Health System.
Public participation in health care is common and uncontroversially
constitutional.
C. Conclusion: The Freedom of Health
Throughout a long line of precedent, the Supreme Court has taken
seriously a principle of individual autonomy in health care decisionmaking—a constitutional freedom of health. That principle explicitly
encompasses a freedom to reject unwanted medical care and implicitly
encompasses a freedom to obtain at least certain kinds of medical care.
Although it is true that the Court has never applied a naked freedom of health to invalidate governmental action, two features of substantive constitutional rights might explain the infrequency with which
invalidation occurs. First, all such constitutional liberty interests must
be balanced against competing regulatory interests. In the case of
health care, especially public health, there are many such collective
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interests that might outweigh individual autonomy. Second, substantive constitutional rights restrict only regulation, not participation,
and the United States has largely relied on participatory rather than
regulatory approaches to govern health care decisionmaking. The
rarity of invalidation in this case, thus, does not disprove or even
much weaken the case for a constitutional freedom of health.
II. RECENT DEBATES
Assuming, then, that a constitutional freedom of health exists,
that the individual freedom must be balanced against compelling regulatory interests, and that the constitutional freedom cannot invalidate participatory approaches to health care regulation, what implications does that constitutional rule have for recent hot-button issues in
health care regulation? How should we evaluate various autonomyrestricting proposals and regulations, such as the phantom death panels, the 2009 H1N1 vaccine distribution program, the FDA’s restrictions on access to experimental drugs, PPACA’s antiobesity and antismoking regulations, and, most relevantly, PPACA’s individual
mandate? This Part will address each of those issues in turn, with a
hope of fleshing out a framework for the freedom of health.
A. Death Panels
Throughout the congressional debates over national health care
reform, Alaska Governor Sarah Palin and other conservative commentators warned that the legislative proposals would create death panels,
authorizing the government to determine whether sick and elderly pa128
In her initial account,
tients should be allowed to get treatment.
Governor Palin implied that the death panels would allow the govern129
ment to block access to all care, including privately funded care; only
later did the conservative commentary refine the story to Medicare-only
130
rationing.
Although never actually proposed in Congress (or any128

See Palin, supra note 16.
See id. (asserting that the health care law would require “my baby with Down
Syndrome . . . to stand in front of Obama’s ‘death panel’ so his bureaucrats can decide, based on a subjective judgment of their ‘level of productivity in society,’ whether
they are worthy of health care”).
130
See, e.g., Robert Longley, Health Care Reform and ‘Death Panels’—The Facts,
ABOUT.COM, http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/healthcare/a/deathpanels.htm (last
visited Mar. 15, 2011) (“Across the Internet, blogs and e-mails are claiming that the
America’s Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009 (H.R. 3200) requires all Medicare
beneficiaries to attend mandatory classes once every five years in which they will be in129
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where else), the initial account of the phantom death panels—public
rationing of privately funded and privately provided care—is a useful
starting point in considering the freedom of health and its operation.
The kind of direct government rationing that Governor Palin feared is
a prototypical example of what the freedom of health ought to forbid.
According to Tea Party mythology, death panels would have authorized the government, presumably through criminal prohibitions
or other direct regulatory strategies, to pick and choose which indi131
viduals would be allowed access to scarce health care resources. To
use Governor Palin’s example, the government would have been allowed to decide that her child with Down Syndrome is unworthy of
care and that the child should be allowed to die rather than be
132
treated. Governor Palin thus imagined the death panels as a regulatory, not participatory, strategy to prevent the sick and the elderly from
consuming our scarce health care resources. In that form, death panels
would have been a direct affront to individual autonomy and a severe
constraint on the important liberty interest in health care decisionmaking. The imagined regulatory structure would have made it significantly harder, if not impossible, for some patients to access health
care, even if the patients were willing to use their own money to purchase it.
Could such death panels be upheld as narrowly tailored regulations that serve a compelling state interest? I think not. Although
health care inflation is certainly a real problem that needs to be addressed and although we may spend more than we rationally should on
care for the sick and the elderly, there are cost-control strategies that
would infringe far less on the protected liberty interest than direct
public rationing. Furthermore, there is no definite answer on how
much we should rationally spend on care for the sick and the elderly,
so it is hard to claim conclusively that current spending levels are too
high or that spending levels would be more appropriate if we rationed

structed on how to end their lives.”); Domenico Montanaro, RNC Perpetuates
“Death Panels” Rumor, MSNBC FIRST READ (Aug. 19, 2009, 2:27 PM), http://
firstread.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2009/08/19/4430434-rnc-perpetuates-death-panelsrumor (reporting on Republican National Committee Chairman Michael Steele’s references to Medicare rationing); Sam Stein, Grassley Endorses “Death Panel” Rumor: “You
Have Every Right to Fear,” HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 12, 2009, 1:31 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/08/12/grassley-endorses-death-p_n_257677.html
(quoting Iowa Senator Charles Grassley’s references to death panels, all of which focused on Medicare beneficiaries’ end-of-life decisions).
131
See Palin, supra note 16.
132
Id.
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care through death panels. That is, it is not clear that the savings
gained from blocking some patients’ access to care would be worth the
cost in lost years of life or in increased pain and suffering. The mone133
tization of life years and of pain and suffering is inordinately difficult,
as is the determination of worthiness to consume care. We therefore
lack a precise measure or even a compelling sense of the cost-benefit
trade, in the absence of which it would be hard for the government to
demonstrate that the regulatory strategy was serving any state interest
at all, much less that it was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling one.
What about the Tea Party’s revised sense of the death panels? What
if, instead of using a direct regulatory strategy like criminalization, Congress amended the Medicare and Medicaid Acts to authorize the same
kind of death panels for public health care coverage decisions, allowing
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to deny public insurance coverage to those deemed unworthy? Importantly, unlike Governor Palin’s initial conception of the death panels, this approach would
leave individuals free to consume health care at their own expense,
simply denying some individuals public funding for care. In other
words, the approach would be primarily a participatory one rather than
a regulatory one. As such, the freedom of health would not apply directly, but it should be incorporated into an equal protection analysis,
justifying strict scrutiny of differential treatment among Medicare and
134
Medicaid beneficiaries based on their health status.
In short, direct health care rationing would infringe individuals’
fundamental liberty interest in health care autonomy. Because it is almost certainly not the least infringing approach to health care cost control, it ought to be unconstitutional under a freedom-of-health analysis.
In their objections to the notion of death panels, thus, Sarah Palin and
other members of the Tea Party movement were not completely offbase. Had the government ever proposed and passed such an approach, it would have been an unconstitutional extension of govern-

133

Value of a statistical life (VSL) approximations give us the best estimates for life
years and pain and suffering, but those studies are widely divergent and tend to break
down when the lives at issue are known rather than statistical. See PETER A. UBEL, PRICING LIFE 3 (2000) (providing an anecdotal example of the failure of VSL analysis after
introduction of a known life); W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical
Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
5, 6-7 (2003) (noting that the variability of VSL approximations makes “matching . . . values to the pertinent population at risk . . . problematic”).
134
Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (referencing the liberty interests in marriage and procreation as a justification for applying strict scrutiny to a
sterilization law that discriminated among criminal categories).
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mental power. In their regulatory form, the imaginary death panels
serve as a prototype for unconstitutional exercises of authority under
the freedom of health, and even in a participatory incarnation, they
should give rise to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
B. H1N1 Vaccine Distribution
The 2009 H1N1 vaccine distribution program presents an interesting case for the freedom of health. In the face of a vaccine shortage
and swine flu outbreak, federal and state governments set up a program that effectively prevented some individuals from accessing the
135
vaccine for a period of about two months.
As such, the program
hindered some individuals’ freedom to consume the vaccine, burdening their liberty interest in health care autonomy. Furthermore, the
guidelines for vaccine distribution prioritized certain individuals over
others based on risk factors such as age, health, and profession, rais136
Aling a specter of direct rationing according to “worthiness.”
though it is unclear whether anyone actually faced penalties for distributing the vaccine against the guidelines, the states were authorized
to require that only at-risk individuals be vaccinated in the first rounds
of allocation, and at least three states provide for civil penalties for
137
misdistribution of vaccines during a shortage. The vaccine distribution program thus operated somewhat similarly to the feared death
panels, allowing the government to decide which people should get
limited health care resources and perhaps blocking some people from
consuming care that they wanted to purchase with their own money.
135

See Questions & Answers: Vaccine Against 2009 H1N1 Influenza Virus, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/H1N1flu/vaccination/public/
vaccination_qa_pub.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (explaining the CDC’s recommendation that high-risk groups receive vaccines first); see also Betsy McKay, Public Faces
Long Wait to Get New Flu Vaccine, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2009, at A1 (describing the allocation of the initially limited vaccine supply); Donald G. McNeil Jr., Vaccine Supply May
Miss Swine Flu Peak, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2009, at A11 (expressing epidemiologists’
concern that vaccines would not be available soon enough to adequately protect the
population).
136
See 2009 H1N1 Vaccination Recommendations, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION (Oct. 15, 2009, 10:00 AM), http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/vaccination/
acip.htm (listing vaccine distribution priorities).
137
See, e.g., 2004 N.J. Laws 1545-46 (providing for a $500 civil penalty for willful or
knowing violations of a 2004-05 influenza vaccine reallocation plan); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 433.040 (2009) (providing for a $500 civil penalty for violations of a health authority
vaccination plan in cases of shortage); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-76-3 (Supp. 2008) (same). See
generally James G. Hodge, Jr. & Jessica P. O’Connell, The Legal Environment Underlying Influenza Vaccine Allocation and Distribution Strategies, 12 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. PRACTICE 340
(2006) (analyzing state responses to the 2004-05 flu vaccine shortage).
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There are two important distinctions, though, between the H1N1
program and the bald rationing of the fictional death panels. First,
the program was participatory rather than regulatory. The Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) had purchased the entire
available supply of the vaccine and had distributed it back to providers
138
and patients—at no additional cost—through state governments. In
the vast majority of states, there was no law prohibiting individuals
from buying the vaccine through a private supplier; there was simply
139
no private supply available. Furthermore, the federal government’s
distribution guidelines and similar guidelines in most states were
140
purely informational and thus participatory; they were merely government speech. In forty-seven states, there was no penalty for ignoring those guidelines in either the distribution or the consumption of
141
the vaccine. Second, even the restrictions that the three penalizing
states imposed for misdistribution of the vaccine probably could have
passed strict scrutiny. The penalty was a $500 civil fine for each in142
stance of misdistribution, which would have imposed some burden
on individuals’ liberty interest in accessing the vaccine but a lesser
burden than criminal sanctions or heftier fines. And in this case, that
fine seems justified: First, there was a known and discrete shortage in
the vaccine supply. Second, there were clearly identifiable factors that
put some individuals at greater risk than others of catching the flu,
such as working with small children, or at greater risk of being signifi143
These two concantly harmed by the flu, such as being pregnant.
crete factors—supply shortage and individual risk—contrast with the
nebulous factors that would justify death panels—overall spending
and individual worthiness. There was therefore a concrete need in

138

See generally State & Local Vaccination Guidance: Vaccine Distribution Q&A, CTRS.
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Nov. 3, 2009, 4:00 PM), http://www.cdc.gov/
H1N1flu/vaccination/statelocal/centralized_distribution_qa.htm (outlining the vaccine distribution system to states).
139
See Betsy McKay et al., Obama Targets Swine-Flu Response, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26,
2009, at A3 (explaining federal government efforts to purchase and support production of vaccine doses).
140
See Benjamin E. Berkman, Incorporating Explicit Ethical Reasoning into Pandemic
Influenza Policies, 26 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’ Y 1, 8-9 (2009) (“[P]roviders
will . . . not be bound by the guidelines . . . and likely will feel pressured to give vaccine
to . . . vaccine seekers who are not at elevated risk of infection or complication.”); Hodge
& O’Connell, supra note 137, at 342 (noting that CDC guidelines are merely advisory).
141
Cf. supra note 137 (noting the three states that did establish penalties for violating vaccine distribution guidelines).
142
Id.
143
See 2009 H1N1 Vaccination Recommendations, supra note 136.
FOR
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2009 to steer the limited H1N1 vaccine resources toward certain populations, at least until the supply could catch up to demand, to limit
the public health consequences of the swine flu outbreak. Although
the distribution program effectively impeded some individuals’ freedom to obtain the H1N1 vaccine by socializing the vaccine supply, the
CDC’s and the states’ participatory programs could have passed constitutional muster.
C. Experimental Drugs
Another interesting case for the freedom of health is the the subject of the Abigail Alliance opinions: the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) restrictions on access to experimental drugs. In Abigail
Alliance, a group of patients claimed a fundamental liberty interest in
144
accessing potentially lifesaving drugs. They wanted access only to socalled post–Phase I drugs, which are drugs that have been deemed
safe in the first phase of FDA clinical trials and will be tested for effec145
tiveness in Phase II trials. Under current law, drug companies may
not advertise or market Phase II drugs at all, and they may sell such
drugs only to patients who qualify for a “compassionate-use” exception
146
from the FDA. Even then, drug companies may sell Phase II drugs
only at cost, which is not enough to cover liability risks. A patient’s
best option for obtaining Phase II drugs, therefore, is to apply to be a
147
But that option is far from a failsafe.
subject in the clinical trial.
The patient might not be accepted to participate if she does not make
a good clinical subject for any reason, and even if accepted as a subject, the patient might be given a placebo instead of the active drug.
Outside of the trials, patients may wait years for the drug to be ap148
proved and marketed.
The three-judge panel in Abigail Alliance found that these restrictions on access to Phase II drugs violated individuals’ liberty interest

144

See Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d 695, 701 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
See id.
146
See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006) (requiring FDA approval before a drug may be introduced or delivered for introduction into interstate commerce).
147
See Jerry Menikoff, Beyond Abigail Alliance: The Reality Behind the Right to Get Experimental Drugs, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1045, 1057-58 (2008).
148
See id. at 1051; cf. Michael D. Greenberg, AIDS, Experimental Drug Approval, and
the FDA New Drug Screening Process, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 300 (2000) (noting that FDA regulation may be creating a “drug lag” in the United States as compared
to drug development in Europe).
145
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149

in obtaining medical care.
The D.C. Circuit, however, reheard the
case en banc and overturned the panel’s decision, holding that no
150
Under a freedom-ofsuch constitutional liberty interest exists.
health analysis, the panel was obviously right to recognize the liberty
interest, though I would argue that the FDA restrictions serve a compelling state interest and are therefore potentially valid.
To establish that drugs provide effective treatment, we need to
conduct clinical trials, and those clinical trials need to include control
groups that receive placebos instead of active drugs. A rational patient,
however, would not choose to participate in a trial—and thereby to risk
receiving a placebo—if she could instead access the drug on the market, particularly where the drug has already been proven safe in Phase I
151
trials. To preserve the public good of effectiveness studies, therefore,
we have a compelling collective interest in restricting individuals’ access
to Phase II drugs outside of the clinical trials.
That said, the plaintiffs in Abigail Alliance could have argued that
the restrictions are not narrowly tailored to serve the relevant interest.
Many patients might apply for the clinical trial and be rejected for various reasons having nothing to do with the drug’s likely safety or effectiveness. For example, some patients might have other conditions
that would be hard to control for in the study, regardless of whether
those conditions were likely to affect the drug’s performance. Under
current FDA restrictions, even patients who applied to participate in
the trials and were rejected are forbidden to access Phase II drugs on
152
the market. The compassionate-use exceptions are administratively
burdensome, making access difficult and risky for both patients and
153
Given that the relevant state interest is to avoid freedoctors.
riding—to preserve an incentive for patients to volunteer for the trials—there is no reason to forbid access to patients who were willing
but not allowed to participate. Once a patient has applied for the trial
149

See Abigail Alliance I, 445 F.3d 470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
See Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 712.
151
See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Right to Experimental Treatment: FDA New Drug Approval, Constitutional Rights, and the Public’s Health, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 269, 274 (2009).
152
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006).
153
See, e.g., Clarification of FDA Regulations and Guidance on “Compassionate” and
“Humanitarian” Use, STANFORD U. RES. COMPLIANCE OFF. ( Jan. 2006), http://
humansubjects.stanford.edu/research/documents/compassionate_humanitarian_use_
FDA_GUI01036.pdf (explaining FDA regulations and guidance for the
compassionate-use exception); UCSF Human Research Protection Program Guidelines
on Emergency Use and Compassionate Use, U.C.S.F. HUM. RES. PROTECTION PROGRAM,
http://www.research.ucsf.edu/chr/guide/chrEmerUse.asp#CU (last visited Mar. 15,
2011) (same).
150
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and been rejected, she should have a constitutional right to access
Phase II drugs.
D. Obesity and Smoking Regulations
Obesity and smoking regulations provide interesting foils for one
another. Under the proposed freedom-of-health analysis, I would
argue that direct penalties for eating fatty foods should be unconstitutional while the same direct penalties for smoking might not be. That
said, the participatory approaches that the government has used (such
154
as Michelle Obama’s “Let’s Move” initiative ) and the nonrestrictive
regulatory approaches included in PPACA (such as menu labeling re155
156
quirements and wellness initiatives ) should be constitutional with
respect to both food and smoking.
To start, I need to make the case that regulations targeting smoking and eating impinge on the liberty interest in controlling one’s
own health. In doctrinal terms, the claim is that the freedom to reject
care should include a freedom to reject preventive care such as diet,
exercise, and smoking cessation. In more colloquial terms, the claim
is that we should be free to choose a shorter lifespan that includes
donuts and cigarettes over a longer lifespan that includes only carrots
and exercise. That choice is ultimately a health care choice that falls
under the ambit of the freedom of health. As a result, any regulation
that punishes people for smoking should raise constitutional questions,
as should any regulation that punishes people for choosing fatty foods.
Why, then, are obesity and smoking foils for one another if regulations in both realms implicate the freedom of health? The critical
point here is that the collective interest in curbing smoking is much
stronger and much more concrete—an interest among nonsmokers in
avoiding deleterious effects of second-hand smoke—than the collective interest in curbing obesity. This point, of course, is not new; the
second-hand smoke justification for regulating cigarettes is well ac154

See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Childhood Obesity Battle Is Taken Up by First Lady, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, at A16 (discussing Michelle Obama’s program to “revamp” the
way American children eat and exercise).
155
See PPACA § 4205, 21 U.S.C.A. § 343(q)(5)(H) (West Supp. 1 2010) (requiring
chain restaurants and retail food establishments to provide nutritional information for
regularly offered food items).
156
See id. § 4202, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300u-14 (West Supp. 1A 2010) (offering funding to
states “to provide public health community interventions, screenings, and . . . clinical
referrals for individuals who are between 55 and 64 years of age”); id. § 10408, 42
U.S.C.A. § 2802 note (West Supp. 1B 2010) (offering funding to employers for wellness programs that promote healthy lifestyles and disease self-management).
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cepted, and others before me have noted that obesity imposes no similar negative externalities (except to the extent that we choose to subsidize the health care costs of obesity through Medicare and Medica157
id). The effects of second hand smoke, thus, provide a compelling
state interest for banning public smoking, though perhaps not for
banning private smoking (in one’s home, for example). The effects
of obesity, by contrast, are mostly individual, such that the only state
interest in banning unhealthy foods is a paternalistic one. That paternalistic interest should not be cognizable where the relevant liberty
interest is an individual freedom to make unhealthy choices free from
governmental paternalism—which is what the right to reject care essentially is. If we have a genuine freedom of health, therefore, bans on
consumption of unhealthy foods should be unconstitutional in a way
that bans on smoking should not be. A few modern regulations might
158
be unconstitutional under this analysis, including bans on trans fats
159
and so-called “fat taxes.”
That said, the freedom of health ought not to forbid the government from requiring smokers or obese individuals to pay more for
Medicare and Medicaid coverage than nonsmokers and nonobese individuals. Such a system would not penalize the choice to be unhealthy; it would simply require unhealthy individuals to pay for the consequences of their choices or to forego care for their lung cancer or
diabetes. Such a system would be no different from requiring people
to pay damages for defamation; they are free to speak but must pay for
the damage they cause by speaking.
Furthermore, informational campaigns, labeling requirements,
and private wellness initiatives should present no constitutional problem under a freedom-of-health analysis. Informational campaigns are
merely government speech, participatory actions that individuals remain free to ignore. Labeling requirements are regulatory because
they require manufacturers to engage in particular behaviors, but
their effect on health care choices is no greater than that of public informational campaigns; they leave individual consumers free to ignore
the labels and to continue smoking and eating. Purely informational

157

See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Taxing Obesity—Or Perhaps the Opposite, 53 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 575, 582 (2005–06).
158
See, e.g., Phila., Pa., Health Code § 6-307 (2011) (prohibiting trans fats in food
served at restaurants).
159
See Jeff Strnard, Conceptualizing the “Fat Tax”: The Role of Food Taxes in Developed
Economies, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1221, 1226 (2005) (discussing food taxes that “explicitly
attempt to influence behavior to meet public health goals”).
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strategies, thus, should face no constitutional problem. The wellness
initiatives are trickier because they effectively punish unhealthy choices by denying benefits to people who refuse to participate in wellness
160
programs. But all such programs currently in existence are privately
provided and regulated only to prevent excessive discrimination on
the basis of health status. Therefore, under the state action doctrine,
these programs are constitutional.
E. The Individual Mandate
The most notable controversy regarding the constitutionality of
health care regulation today is the debate over the individual
mandate. The substantive due process challenge that I consider here,
however, has not been a prominent one in that debate. Instead, most
scholars and lawyers have focused on structural questions, particularly
whether Congress has authority to require individual insurance coverage under either its power to tax or its power to regulate interstate
161
commerce. Indeed, even those scholars who argue that the mandate
is unconstitutional because it infringes individual liberty do not rely
on substantive due process—much less on a freedom of health—to
162
support their claims. Of course, their hesitation is understandable;
the claim that we have a substantive due process right not to buy
163
health insurance sounds like a Lochner-style claim.
Under a freedom of health, though, the substantive due process
analysis seems more plausible than most scholars have made it out to
be. The mandate requires individuals to carry health insurance cov160

See Cynthia A. Baker, Bottom Lines and Waist Lines: State Governments Weigh In on
Wellness, 5 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 185, 189 (2008) (“[T]o the extent government supported wellness initiatives ostracize, isolate, and punish . . . unhealthy individuals,
those initiatives should be doubly criticized . . . .”); Thomas J. Parisi, The Onus Is on
You: Wellness Plans and Other Strategies Being Employed for Patients to Take Ownership of
Their Health, 13 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 243, 268-69 (2010) (discussing methods by
which employers use wellness programs to penalize nonparticipants).
161
See, e.g., Randy Barnett et al., Why the Personal Mandate to Buy Health Insurance Is
Unprecedented and Unconstitutional, LEGAL MEMORANDUM (Heritage Found., Washington, D.C.), Dec. 9, 2009, at 1-2 (arguing that the individual mandate exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause).
162
See Hall, supra note 3, at 41 (discussing possible constitutional challenges to the
individual mandate based upon religious freedom, due process, and the Takings
Clause); James Taranto, Op-Ed., ‘A Commandeering of the People,’ WALL ST. J., July 24–25,
2010, at A11 (suggesting an argument against the individual mandate premised upon
the Tenth Amendment’s preservation of power to the people).
163
See Hall, supra note 3, at 45 (rejecting the possibility of a substantive due process
claim against PPACA because “there is no fundamental right to be uninsured”).
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164

erage throughout the tax year or pay a penalty.
At first blush, this
requirement does not impinge at all on an individual’s freedom either
to refuse or to obtain health care. It prohibits individuals from refusing health insurance, not any particular health care, and individuals
with insurance coverage remain free to consume any care they choose.
Indeed, insurance might enable individuals to consume some care
that they otherwise would not be able to afford, thereby expanding
individuals’ freedom to make health care choices.
But today’s insurance contracts are not mere risk pools, gathering
and distributing funds for health care consumption at the discretion
of the insured. Instead, today’s contracts give insurers variable
amounts of discretion under “medical necessity” review to decide
whether their insured can buy various kinds of health care with the
165
That is, insurance companies today use their conpool’s money.
tracts to steer individuals towards certain health care consumption decisions, often refusing to cover treatments that they deem ineffective,
unnecessary, or even just inordinately costly. As such, an individual’s
choice among different kinds of insurance contracts—or her choice
to enter no such contract at all—will impact her health care consumption. If she is required to buy into such a contract, a patient will give
up some degree of freedom and autonomy to choose her own care; at
a minimum, she will lose some freedom to direct the care that she
purchases with the dollars that she has set aside in insurance. Furthermore, PPACA outlaws the most freedom-preserving kinds of
insurance (such as high-deductible sickness and accident insurance),
166
requiring all insurance contracts to provide extensive benefits.
Those requirements mean that most health care will be covered, but
they also mean that the insurance companies will be allowed to review
most consumption decisions for medical necessity.

164

See PPACA §§ 1501, 16106, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West Supp. 1A 2010) (setting
the penalty scheme for failure to maintain minimal essential coverage); see also STAFF
OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE
PROVISIONS OF THE “RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010,” AS AMENDED, IN COMBINATION
WITH THE “PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT” 31-34 (Comm. Print
2010), available at http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3673
(providing information on the present law and the penalties that PPACA will impose).
165
See Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers’ Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1640-41, 1672-73 (1992) (describing the discretion provided insurers to conduct “medical necessity” review in health care contracts).
166
See PPACA § 1302, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022 (West Supp. 1B 2010) (setting forth
minimal health benefits that qualified health plans must cover).
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Of course, even the most restrictive insurance contracts leave their
beneficiaries free to pay out of pocket for care that the insurance
companies will not cover. The requirement to carry insurance, thus,
does not fully strip individuals of the freedom to make alternative
consumption decisions. As a result, it is possible to argue that the
negative liberty interest is intact; individuals remain free to obtain
whatever care they can afford, just as they would be without an insurance contract. But standard constitutional analysis is not usually satisfied with that kind of marginal, retained freedom if a regulatory regime burdens the protected freedom’s exercise in a meaningful way.
In speech, for example, a regulatory regime that has the real-world effect of chilling speech will be unconstitutional even if the regulation
167
Similarly, an abortion
does not fully negate the freedom to speak.
regulation might be unconstitutional if it has the real-world effect of
making abortion a harder choice, even if women retain the freedom
to choose an abortion in the face of the regulatory regime; that real168
world effect is the crux of the “undue burden” analysis. In this case,
requiring individuals to enter insurance contracts and thereby authorizing insurance companies to perform “medical necessity” review
places at least some burden on individuals’ freedom to choose their
own health care. It will have the real-world effect of swaying health
169
care choices.
There seems, therefore, to be a colorable claim that the mandate
infringes the freedom of health by requiring individuals to enter
discretion-limiting insurance contracts—requiring individuals to give
a third-party insurer the power to influence or even to direct their
health care spending. The argument is not a bald, Lochner-era claim
of freedom of contract; it is a claim that these particular contracts
make it harder for individuals to exercise an independently protected
liberty interest in health care decisionmaking. For an analogy, imagine that some Internet service providers were contractually autho167

See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965) (invalidating a regulation that required recipients of mail to authorize deliveries of “communist political propaganda” on the ground that it would have a chilling effect on communist expression).
168
See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 937-38 (2000) (applying the “undue burden” standard to invalidate prohibitions on so-called “partial-birth abortions”); Akron
v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452-53 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (articulating the undue burden standard), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
169
See, e.g., Aetna v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 201-02 (2004) (recounting the stories of
two plaintiffs who made health care consumption decisions in accordance with their
insurance companies’ determinations of medical necessity rather than purchasing alternative care out of pocket).
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rized to monitor our Internet usage and to block our access to sites
that they deemed unnecessary or inappropriate (for example, if they
saw that we spent too much time on Facebook during work hours),
and imagine that the government required us to buy Internet access
through such a contract. I imagine that the freedom of speech would
come into play there—at least as a colorable argument, if not as a successful tool—even though the regulation would center on a contract
and even if we were free to access the blocked content through other
channels, through other media, or through out-of-pocket payment.
The freedom-of-health argument against the mandate thus seems colorable and difficult—certainly more viable, I think, than a mere reference to Lochner would lead us to believe.
Ultimately, however, even if the freedom of health presents a colorable limitation for the individual mandate, the law as currently written should pass muster under the balancing test. Expanding health
insurance coverage and decreasing the cost of insurance on the individual market should count as compelling state interests, but we can
neither expand coverage nor control individual market costs as long
as insurers fear adverse selection. That is, insurance companies will
continue to raise prices on the individual market and will continue to
deny coverage as long as they worry that the people seeking insurance
are more likely than average to be sick. The mandate addresses that
problem by requiring that everyone, sick and healthy alike, enter the
insurance pool.
Furthermore, there can be no doubt that the mandate is narrowly
tailored. Indeed, it is perhaps too narrowly tailored. The mandate
170
claims that it imposes a penalty (or a fine or a tax) of $695 per year
171
or 2.5% of taxable income (whichever is greater) for any individual
who refuses to buy insurance. The cost of an individual insurance
172
Many Americans
contract, though, is more than $695 per year.
170

Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 § 1602(a)(2), 26
U.S.C.A. § 5000A(c)(3) (West Supp. 1A 2010).
171
PPACA § 10106(b)(2), 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(c)(2).
172
See Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Obama Plan to Be Costly for Some Uninsured, DETROIT
FREE PRESS, July 1, 2010, at B5 (acknowledging that new health coverage for previously
uninsured individuals may have premiums as high as $900); Janet Trautwein, Op-Ed.,
Why We Need a Strong Individual Mandate, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2009, at A19 (pointing
out that as long as the penalty for failing to purchase insurance is not comparable to
the cost of coverage, Americans will continue to avoid procuring insurance).
Median household income in the United States is about $40,000 per year. See Table of Personal Income for People 25 Years Old and Over with Work Experience in
2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032010/
perinc/new03_010.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). The exemption is $3650, see I.R.S.
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might therefore rationally choose to pay the penalty rather than carry
insurance, leaving them free to direct their own health care consumption. Furthermore, the penalty itself is extremely difficult for the government to enforce. PPACA did not give the Internal Revenue Service any power to assess the tax or to collect the fine or penalty except
173
Individuals thus reby deducting from future income tax refunds.
main free to ignore the penalty so long as they never pay more tax
than they owe, allowing them to remain uninsured without penalty.
In short, the law of the individual mandate barely infringes liberty; it
seems to be a mere rhetorical or expressive attempt to convince individuals to buy insurance rather than an actual exercise of police power
to require universal coverage.
In the end, then, the individual mandate might present a harder
case under substantive due process than most commentators have assumed and might present an increasingly difficult case if Congress ever gives the mandate teeth. As written, however, the law ought to pass
muster under the state-interest override given that it is minimally infringing.
CONCLUSION
The individual freedom of health has lurked in Supreme Court
precedent for several decades, but it has not emerged with a life of its
own. Its spectral existence may be due in part to our recognition of
many legitimate regulatory interests in health care and public health.
Ultimately, however, those regulatory interests can and should be balanced against the individual liberty interest within the constitutional
doctrine. We ought, therefore, to recognize the freedom of health
and to apply it with a standard state-interest-override potential,
through strict or intermediate scrutiny.

Form 1040A, at l. 26 (2010), making median taxable income $36,350 ($40,000 - $3650).
Two and one-half percent of that is $908.75. Using the $900 estimate for insurance
premiums, that leaves most taxpayers’ penalty smaller than the cost of insurance (most
being defined as everyone below the median). And, of course, the average cost of individual coverage today is significantly higher than $900 per year; the $900 figure is a generous estimate of how much costs will go down once the exchanges and regulations
are in place.
173
See J. Paul Singleton, Can You Really Have Too Much of a Good Thing?: How Benevolent Tax Policies Have Attributed to the Explosion of Health Care Costs and How New Policies
Threaten to Do More of the Same, 8 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 305, 326-28 (2010) (explaining how the IRS’s inability to enforce the penalty through use of liens or seizers will
decrease the individual mandate’s effectiveness).
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If we apply that formula to recent hot-button issues in health care
regulation, most of what the government has actually accomplished
should pass constitutional muster. Both our national and state governments have primarily focused on participatory approaches to
health care, and even the regulatory exercises address compelling
state interests and present minimal infringements of individual liberty.
That said, the restrictions on access to Phase II experimental drugs, the
ban on trans fats, and the “fat taxes” on sugary and fatty foods present
constitutional problems, and the individual mandate presents a harder
case under a freedom of health than most scholars have recognized.

